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Two time-reversal quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes are the quantum entanglement based
device-independent (DI)-QKD and measurement-device-independent (MDI)-QKD. The recently pro-
posed twin field (TF)-QKD, also known as phase-matching (PM)-QKD, has improved the key rate
bound from O (η) to O
(√
η
)
with η the channel transmittance. In fact, TF-QKD is a kind of MDI-
QKD but based on single-photon detection. In this paper, we propose a different PM-QKD based
on single-photon entanglement, referred to as SEPM-QKD, which can be viewed as a time-reversed
version of the TF-QKD. Detection loopholes of the standard Bell test, which often occur in DI-QKD
over long communication distances, are not present in this protocol because the measurement set-
tings and key information are the same quantity which is encoded in the local weak coherent state.
We give a security proof of SEPM-QKD and demonstrate in theory that it is secure against all
collective attacks and beam-splitting attacks. The simulation results show that the key rate enjoys
a bound of O
(√
η
)
with respect to the transmittance. SEPM-QKD not only helps us understand
TF-QKD more deeply, but also hints at a feasible approach to eliminate detection loopholes in
DI-QKD for long-distance communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a secure commu-
nication method to enabling a secret random number
string to be shared by two well-separated parties, says
Alice and Bob, has been proven to be robust against
channel attacks and against the power of quantum
computation[1, 2]. The random number string, known
only to Alice and Bob, can be used to encrypt messages
transmitted between them. In theoretical research, the
work has focused on the secureness of QKD taking into
consideration the imperfections of actual devices[3–7]. In
practical applications, research on the extractable key
rate has been categorized as focusing on improving the
key rate, such as decoy state protocols[8–12], asymmetric
coding[13–15], higher dimensional systems[16–21], and
parameter optimization[22–25], or focusing on improving
the key communication distance[13, 26, 27].
In addition to the recent satellite QKD scheme[28],
the current mainstream QKD is based on photon trans-
mission over optical fiber. For a given QKD scheme,
the factors that determine the key rate and commu-
nication distance are the error rate and the transmit-
tance η. In the initial stage of QKD research, a single-
photon was used as the carrier of quantum information
and secret key rate was bounded to O (η)[29–31], which
is equal to the maximum probability of successful detec-
tion of a single-photon state. The measurement-device-
independent (MDI)-QKD proposed latter is based on the
correlation measurement of a two-photon state and closed
∗ zhaosm@njupt.edu.cn
all detection loopholes[26, 32]. Because the error rate
for MDI-QKD has a quadratic decrease with respect to
BB84, the communication distance doubled. However,
the transmittance for a single-photon in MDI-QKD is
unchanged, and so the key rate is still bounded by O (η).
In Lucamarini et al. (2018) the twin-field (TF)-
QKD[33], also known as phase-matching (PM)-QKD by
Ma et al.[34], was proposed to improve the key rate. TF-
QKD and PM-QKD are essentially identical, the former
reflects what states are used to carry the keys, and the
latter reflects how the keys are generated. After that,
some variants of TF-QKD have been proposed, such as
the sending or not sending protocol by Wang et al.[35, 36]
and removing of phase randomization and postselection
in the coding mode by cui et al.[37]. TF-QKD is a single-
photon version of MDI-QKD[38, 39], in which a single
count is used to extract the quantum key. In TF-QKD,
the information carrier is no longer a single photon but a
weak coherent field or wave state with definite phase and
amplitude[39]. Independent coherent states with locked
global phase can interfere with each other, so they can be
used in phase matching to extract keys. A weak coherent
state can be approximated as a coherent superposition of
a vacuum state and a single photon state. The detection
probability has a
√
η dependence on the channel trans-
mittance, which leads to a bound for key rate of O
(√
η
)
.
Because η is a quantity less than 1, this protocol fur-
ther enhances the communication distance of rate keys
in optical fibers.
Indeed, MDI-QKD itself may be regarded as a
time-reversed version of an entanglement-based device-
independent (DI)-QKD[40, 41], and therefore conclude
that TF-QKD is a time-reversed version of the single-
photon entanglement-based DI-QKD. Over 30 years
2FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of SEPM-QKD. An untrusted
third party, Charlie, generates single-photon entanglement,
by injecting a photon into a beam splitter. Alice and Bob
generate a local weak coherent (WC) state
∣∣∣γei(φa(b)+ka(b)pi)
〉
with φa(b) ∈
{−pi
4
, 0, pi
4
, pi
2
}
and ka(b) ∈ {0, 1} to test the quan-
tum nonlocal correlation in wave space and generate the final
key.
ago, scientists proposed and experimentally verified
the existence of single-photon entanglement and con-
firmed the Bell inequalities for quantum correlations
in different forms[42–47]. Subsequently, single-photon-
entanglement-based DI-QKD was proposed in which the
key is extracted according to whether Alice or Bob has
detected that photon[48].However, this work did not at-
tract much attention, let alone the relationship between
this protocol and TF-QKD. In our previous work, we
proposed confirming Bell inequalities for single-photon
entanglement from joint measurements in wave space-
the conjugate space of the photon number space. As
a new carrier of quantum information, the wave state
has similar properties to the weak coherent state; both
can be viewed as a coherent superposition of a vacuum
state and a single-photon state. In this paper, we pro-
pose single-photon entanglement-based phase-matching
(SEPM)-QKD, which is actually a TF-QKD with quan-
tum entanglement. In this protocol, single-photon en-
tanglement provides the quantum link in the commu-
nications between Alice and Bob, who choose the two
groups of phases to encode the key. Monitoring Eve’s
eavesdropping is performed by detecting violations of
Bell inequality. Security proofing against collective at-
tacks and beam-splitting attacks is thereby established.
We also compare the key rate of SEPM-QKD with the
wave-state-based QKD, as for TF(PM)-QKD and single-
photon-based QKD, like the BB84- and MDI-QKD pro-
tocols.
II. THEORY OF SINGLE PHOTON
ENTANGLEMENT
The physical basis of SEPM-QKD is the detection
of single-photon entanglement in wave space, (Fig.1).
When a third-party Charlie directs a single-photon state
onto an optical beam splitter, the photon states at the
two output ports may be regarded as an entangled state
of a vacuum state |0〉 and a single-photon state |1〉 in the
two path modes[42]
|ΨA,B〉 =
√
2
2
[
eiθ |1〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |1〉B
]
, (1)
where eiθ is the accumulated phase difference between
the two arms. Equation (1) is a representation of single-
photon entanglement in photon-number space. Based on
the wave-particle duality in quantummechanics, it is con-
venient to call the conjugate space of this photon num-
ber space the wave space. Applying a two-dimensional
Fourier transformation, we obtain single-photon entan-
glement in the conjugate space
|ΨA,B〉 =
√
2
2
ei(θ−α)[|αA〉w |(α− θ)B〉w
− |(α+ pi)A〉w |(α− θ + pi)B〉w],
(2)
where states with a subscript w denote wave states, α
and α−θ each with a value ranging from 0 to 2pi denotes
the phase characterizing Alice’s and Bob’s wave state.
The pair of orthogonal bases states in wave space are
|α〉w =
√
2
2
[|0〉+ eiα |1〉] ,
|α+ pi〉w =
√
2
2
[|0〉 − eiα |1〉] .
(3)
It is these states that are used to distribute the quantum
correlation between Alice and Bob.
Next, we analyze single-photon entanglement in wave
space. Here we refer to the photon states |α〉w, |α+ pi〉w
as the Z basis if α = 0, and |α〉w, |α+ pi〉w as the Y
basis if α = pi2 ; then the states |0〉 and |1〉 belong to
the X basis. Because the value of α is any real number,
then, if we set the value of θ to zero, the initial single-
photon entangled state is the Bell state
∣∣∣Φ−A,B
〉
w
, which
is rotationally symmetric in the ZY plane.
In our previous work, we demonstrated that a wave
state can be measured through interference with a refer-
ence weak coherent state, as shown in the measurement
device at the sites of Alice and Bob. Assuming that the
weak coherent states selected by Alice and Bob are
∣∣γeiα〉
and
∣∣γeiβ〉 with a same small amplitude γ far less than
1, the weak coherent state has the approximate form
∣∣γeiα〉 ≈ |0〉+ γeiα |1〉+O (γ) , (4)
where α and β are the phase values of the wave states of
Alice and Bob. Taking into account the transmittance of
a single photon η in the optical channel, the dependence
of the measurement results on measurement settings α
and β reads
p (Ai, Bj) =
γ2η
4
[
1 + (−1)i+j cos (α− β)
]
+
γ4
4
, (5)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} are the ordinal numbers the single-
photon detectors of Alice and Bob. If the intensity of the
3weak coherent field γ2 is far less than the transmittance
η, then the second term on the right-hand side of Eq.
(4) may be omitted. According to the above theory, the
single-photon entanglement-based PM-QKD protocol is
described as follows.
III. SEPM-QKD PROTOCOL
State preparation . A single-photon state from a third
untrusted party Charlie is sent to a 50:50 optical beam
splitter to produce a single-photon entangled state close
to the maximum entanglement. Next, he sends the pho-
ton states to Alice and Bob through two identical fibers
with a common transmittance η. Because of channel
noise and Eve’s possible attack, the photon states reach-
ing the terminals of Alice and Bob are not restricted
to ideal single-photon entanglement. A heralded single-
photon source is used to increase the proportion of effec-
tive counting.
Selection of measurement settings . With different
phase-locking methods[49, 50], the lase source of Al-
ice and Bob are perfectly locked to achieve athe same
global phase. Alice generates a random bit string Ka
in which each bit takes value ka ∈ {0, 1} and a ran-
dom phase φa ∈
{−pi4 , 0, pi4 , pi2} corresponding to the
measurements (σZ − σY ) /
√
2, σZ , (σZ + σY ) /
√
2, σY
and then prepares the corresponding weak coherent state∣∣γei(φa+kapi)〉. Simultaneously, Bob generates a weak
coherent state
∣∣γei(φb+kbpi)〉 in which kb ∈ {0, 1} and
φb ∈
{−pi4 , 0, pi4 , pi2}. Alice and Bob interfere their weak
coherent states with the single-photon state distributed
by Charlie to measure the wave states and the inter-
ference results are recorded as the joint counting of the
single-photon detectors on both sides.
Announcement. When all measurements are com-
pleted, Alice and Bob announce their detection results,
i.e., the ordinal numbers of the fired single-photon detec-
tors, and the phase values φa and φb.
Sifting . A successful detection event is defined as hav-
ing only one detector response on both sides at a given
time. After they have announced the phases φa and φb,
the secret key is extracted when φa = φb. If the sum of
the ordinal number i + j is an even number, Alice and
Bob keep their raw key; if i + j is an odd number, then
Bob flips his key.
Parameter estimation . With a single-photon entan-
glement distribution, a bit-flipping error on the X basis
can never happen, otherwise photon number conserva-
tion is violated. In addition to entanglement degradation
caused by channel transmission loss, information loss is
mainly caused by phase noise, i.e., bit flipping on Z and
Y bases. During the measurement, the selection of the
Z and Y bases is equivalent, so the bit error rates on the
two bases, eZ and eY , are equal. Alice and Bob agree on
a random bit string with half the length of the sifted key
to be check-bit to measure the bit error rate e. Next, they
use part of the remaining data in which |φa − φb| = pi4 to
construct the Bell function S on the ZY plane to esti-
mate the maximal information that may have leaked to
Eve.
Key distillation . In the post-processing, Alice and Bob
perform error corrections in accordance with the bit error
rate e and privacy amplification according to the Bell
function S to generate the final secret key.
IV. SECURITY OF SEPM-QKD
In SEPM-QKD, the key is distributed through a non-
localized single-photon entangled state. Alice and Bob
measure entangled states jointly. When entangled states
are eigenstates of joint measurement operators, their
measurements are perfectly correlated. They can extract
keys based on joint measurement results or measurement
settings. Eve’s attack can be monitored based on viola-
tions of Bell’s inequality. At first glance, this protocol
belongs to DI-QKD. Although conventional DI-QKD is
secured in theory, it is nevertheless difficult to distribute
keys over long distances due to detection loopholes.
Here, we point out that the detection loophole in the
standard Bell experiment will not be a factor affecting
the key security of the protocol. Previously, it was found
that the security of QKD can be related to entanglement
purification[3, 4]. The amount of security information
that can be extracted between Alice and Bob is deter-
mined by the amount of purifiable entanglement. In DI-
QKD, we certify that the bound of the accessible private
key is determined by how much entanglement we can dis-
till from the imperfect entangled state[51–53].
In a standard Bell experiment, to give a rigorous proof
of quantum delocalization, all loopholes in the experi-
ment need to be closed, including the efficiency of the
detector and transmission loss[54]. For the DI-QKD pro-
tocol, we just need to accept quantum delocalization as
rigorous and correct. After solving this issue, DI-QKD is
equivalent to the BB84 protocol. In this protocol, we only
focus on the data that can be measured successfully. In a
conventional Bell experiment with polarization entangle-
ment, the measurement in the Z− and X− bases needs
the switching of the angle of the polarizers, which must
be perfectly correlated with the secret key. This may
leave Eve a chance to fabricate the measurement settings
if she takes full control of the measurement setup. In the
following, we need to establish whether in such an event
Eve could fabricate a fake result of the Bell’s inequality
test given the limited information publicly announced by
Alice and Bob.
In SEPM-QKD, Alice and Bob encode the key infor-
mation in the phases of the weak coherent states. The
encoding is equivalent to the measurement settings, and
no switch of the measurement basis is needed. If this
initial key information had been leaked to Eve, all QKD
protocols would fail. From Eq. (5), the quantum mea-
surement of the protocol may be considered to consist of
three systems: the single-photon entangled state
∣∣∣Φ−A,B
〉
,
4the joint states of the single-photon detector D, and the
corresponding joint key states K. The initial state of the
total system is written
ρ(A,B)DK = ρA,B |Nin〉 〈Nin| |κin〉 〈κin| , (6)
which is a tensor product of the three subsystems, with
ρA,B the single-photon entangled state sent by Charlie,
and |Nin〉 and |κin〉 the initial joint states of the two-sided
single-photon detectors and the key state with N = i+ j
and κ = |ka − kb|. Measurement is in general regarded as
a unitary operation of the system; the joint measurement
performed by Alice and Bob with two POVM elements
{Eκ} may be written as
ε
(
ρ(A,B)DK
)
=E+0 ρA,BE0 |even〉 〈even| |0〉 〈0|
+ E+1 ρA,BE1 |odd〉 〈odd| |1〉 〈1| .
(7)
Once the QKD-protocol is determined, after the an-
nouncement of N publicly, the information of κ may be
revealed by Eve. However, she still does not know the ex-
act value of ka and kb. At this stage, we find SEPM-QKD
is equivalent to MDI-QKD. Eve barely gets any informa-
tion about the measurement settings of Alice and Bob,
so it is almost impossible for her to successfully fabricate
the measurement results to cheat Alice and Bob.
With the presence of channel transmission losses and
the imperfections in detection, Eve has the opportunity
to implement various attack schemes. Even though [55,
56] have provided a purification scheme for single-photon
entanglement regarding phase noise, the reality is more
complicated. Alice and Bob’s extractable fully secure key
rate has a lower bound given by[25, 51, 57]
r ≥ I (A : B)− χ (AB : E) , (8)
where I (A : B) = H (A) − H (A|B) is the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob, which is
equal to 1 − H (e), and χ (AB : E) = S (ρAB|i,j) −∑
c p (c)S
(
ρc
AB|i,j
)
the Holevo quantity between Eve
and Alice and Bob after the ordinal numbers i, j have
been announced publicly, here, the quantity H (e) is the
amount of information loss due to bit flipping errors, and
χ (AB : E) is the maximum amount of information Eve
obtains from ρAB at a given error rate e, and for values
of i, j and φa, φb.
There are two kinds of attack schemes on Alice and
Bob that Eve could implement; they correspond to the
two Holevo quantities χ (AB : E). One is a collective at-
tack in which Eve correlates her system with the joint
system of Alice and Bob and produces a total quantum
state ρABE . In this protocol, Eve can not get any in-
formation about the measurement settings, so she can’t
control the measurement process effectively. Her only
freedom is to generate the joint quantum state, in which
the results of Alice and Bob’s reduced states are consis-
tent with predictions from theory, taking into account
the imperfections in the equipment.
For uniformly random marginals in the ZY plane,
Eve’s maximal collective attack will be saturated by send-
ing the entangled single-photon state of which he holds
a purification[51]
|ΨABE〉 =1
2
(I +HAHB) [
√
1− 2e |E0〉
∣∣Φ−AB〉z
+
√
2e |E1〉
∣∣Φ+AB〉z],
(9)
where I is the identity density operator, HA and HB are
Hadamard matrices operated on Alice’s and Bob’s wave
states in ZY plane, which transform Z basis to Y basis,
|E0〉 and |E1〉 are the two orthogonal states hold by Eve,∣∣Φ±AB〉z are the Bell states under the representation of Z
basis. We find that the maximum violation of the CHSH-
Bell inequality is S = 2
√
2 (1− 2e).
We readily find that χ1 (AB : E) ≤ 2e, which means
that whenever Alice and Bob negotiate one bit of in-
formation, Eve can successfully steal 2e bit of informa-
tion. Because we have H (e) ≥ 2e for e ≤ 0.5, thus here
we can reasonably set χ1 (AB : E) to H (e), the upper
bound of security deduced in the entanglement purifica-
tion protocol[3, 4]. Next, we examine the scope of the
Bell-inequality verification. Assume that Eve intercepts
the single-photon entangled state and induce a certain
amount of error rate. The maximum error rate that Bell
inequality tolerates is 14.6%, which is larger than 11%[4],
the maximum error rate that Alice and Bob can tolerate
in extracting finite information against Eve’s collective
attacks. Therefore, violation tests of Bell’s inequality
violation are a feasible scheme for monitoring Eve’s col-
lective attack.
The other possible attack scenario for Eve is the beam-
splitting (BS) attack, in which the loss of a single-photon
entangled state in optical channels can be considered to
be stored by Eve and measured after Alice and Bo have
announced publicly their measurement basis and random
phase. Thus, the BS attack is an individual attack that is
independent of a collective attack and can not be found
with Bell’s inequality tests. Considering channel loss,
the single-photon state between Alice, Bob, and Eve is
written
|ΨABE〉 =
√
2
2
[
√
η (|1A0B〉+ |0A1B〉) |0EA0EB〉
+
√
1− η |0A0B〉 (|1EA0EB〉+ |0EA1EB 〉)],
(10)
which is a single-photon multi-mode asymmetric W-
state[58, 59], where
√
2
2 (|1EA0EB〉+ |0EA1EB〉) is the
state responsible for channel loss, which is assumed to
be stored by Eve, whose system is entangled with the
systems of Alice and Bob. Suppose Eve uses weak co-
herent light of the same intensity as Alice and Bob to
measure the wave state. After Alice and Bob announce
their random phases φa, φb as well as the ordinal num-
bers i, j of the single-photon detectors, for a given chan-
nel transmittance η and local coherent field amplitude γ,
the maximum information that Eve can gain from Alice
5and Bob is
χ2 (AB : E) =
γ2
2
[1−H (p (η, γ))] , (11)
where the quantity p (η, γ) is the normalized probabil-
ity that Eve uses to guess the key of Alice and Bob; its
expression is
p (η, γ) =
1
2 +
√
η (1− η) + γ2
1 + 2γ2
. (12)
Now, if the BS attack is not considered, the key rate
in Eq. (8) is found to be equal to the amount of en-
tanglement that can be distilled between Alice and Bob.
This security proof is equivalent to the security proof
of BB84 QKD based on entanglement purification[3, 4].
The loss of these two parts of the information corresponds
to an error correction and private amplification in post-
processing. After considering Eve’s two attack schemes,
the lost information for private amplification should be
recalibrated.
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
Next, we simulate the distance-dependent key rate in a
real situation. Among all the successful detection events,
there are three kinds of false detection events, which con-
stitute the detection error rate e. These events come from
dark counting of detectors, phase insensitive interference,
and phase misalignment. For all single-photon detectors
with the same dark count rate pdark, the rate of successful
detection events pr,dark and false detection events pe,dark
caused by dark counting are both equal to 2p2dark. For the
joint measurement of wave states, there is a small por-
tion of detection events stemming from phase-insensitive
interference, a HOM-type of interference. The rate for
joint HOM interference is pHOM = γ
4η2d/4 with ηd the
detection efficiency of the single-photon detectors, and
gives rise to a correct detection rate pr,HOM = γ
4η2d/8
and a false detection rate pe,HOM = γ
4η2d/8. In the last
false detection event, the misalignment error rate is ed,
the contribution to the total error rate being pded, where
pd = γ
2η2dT/2 is the probability of a joint measurement
of wave states in ideal single-photon entanglement. Then
the error rate e in terms of these parameters is expressed
as
e ≈ pe,dark + pe,HOM + pded
pdark + pHOM + pd
. (13)
After taking into account all practical factors, such as
error correction and privacy amplification, we obtain a
final lower bound of the key rate of
r ≥ Q
[
1− (1 + f)H (e)− γ
2
2
[1−H (p (η, γ))]
]
, (14)
where Q = pdark+pHOM+pd is the rate of the joint mea-
surement of the wave states, η = exp (−αfx) the channel
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FIG. 2. Simulation of SEPM-QKD under intensities of lo-
cal coherent light. The key rate decreases with increasing
attenuation of the coherent light intensity whereas the com-
munication distance increases as the attenuation increases.
transmittance with αf the coefficient of absorption and x
the transmission distance, and f the inefficiency of error
correction, which always takes the value between 1.2 and
2 in accordance with the error correction protocol[26]. In
this formula, we have assumed the transmittance of the
optical fibers, the amplitude of the local oscillator fields,
and the detector efficiency are the same for Alice and
Bob.
The simulation results of our SEPM-QKD under dif-
ferent intensities of local coherent fields is shown in
Fig.2. The coefficient of transmission loss for the op-
tical fiber at 1550 nm is βl = 0.2dB/km and the co-
efficient of absorption is αf = (βl ln 10) /10. Also, the
detection efficiency at this frequency ηd is 14.5% for a
commercial single-photon detector, the dark count rate
is pdark = 8×10−8 for all detectors, and the misalignment
error ed is 1.5%[34], the value for the inefficiency of error
correction is set at f = 1.2[26]. From this figure, the key
rate is seen to that the key rate decrease as the intensity
of the local coherent light field decreases; because the
probability of successful joint detection events is lower
as the amplitude γ decreases. However, the communica-
tion distance shows an opposite trend in its dependence
on intensity. When the value of γ is less than 0.005,
the communication distance exceeds 420 km, which is
larger than most reported fiber-based repeater-free QKD
protocols. The dependence of the communication dis-
tance on the amplitude γ arises from the false detection
of phase insensitive joint counts pHOM , which is propor-
tional to the square of the light intensity, yielding γ4. For
a specified QKD protocol, the communication distance is
a compromise between the signal rate and the error rate.
As the amplitude γ decreases, the phase-insensitive joint
count-induced error plays little role in the key distillation.
Therefore, a longer communication distance obtains.
Here, we make a clear comparison between different
QKD protocols (Fig.3), in which γ = 0.002 is chosen for
the SEPM-QKD scheme. For traditional single-photon
60 100 200 300 400 500 60010
-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
Ke
y 
ra
te
 lg
(R
)
Communication distance (Km)
 linear bound
 BB84
 MDI
 PM
 SEPM
FIG. 3. Key rate comparison between different QKD pro-
tocols. The simulation results of the other QKD are taken
from Ref.[34]. Compared with single-photon based BB84-
and MDI-QKD schemes which obey the linear bound by Pi-
randola et al. (PLOB bound)[31], SEPM-QKD has the same√
η dependence on communication distance as PM-QKD. For
γ = 0.002, the communication distance of SEPM-QKD is
larger than all previous QDK schemes.
based BB84- and MDI-QKD schemes, their key rate obey
the well-known linear bound by Pirandola et al. (PLOB
bound)[31]. However, we see that, like PM-QKD, SEPM-
QKD displays a quadratic increase in the key rate with
respect to the communication distance. When the com-
munication distance is larger than 340 km, the key rate of
SEPM-QKD surpasses that of BB84 and MDI-QKD. Fur-
thermore, the communication distance of SEPM-QKD is
larger than 490 km with γ = 0.002 compared with 450
km reported for PM-QKD. For short communication dis-
tances, the key rate of SEPM-QKD is always less than
that of PM-QKD. This is because the average intensity of
the coherent light in SEPM-QKD is far lower than that
in PM-QKD.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have reported a phase matching QKD based on
single-photon entanglement. This SEPM-QKD is a time-
reversed version of TF-QKD, in which the secret key
is encoded in wave space characterized by the phase
value. Measurement settings in SEPM-QKD, like quan-
tum keys, are encoded in the phase of the locally coherent
state, so the detection loophole is closed. This contrasts
that for conventional DI-QKD. For a given light source
intensity, just like TF-QKD, SEPM-QKD improves the
bound of key rate from O (η) to O
(√
η
)
. A communi-
cation distance of 490 km can be achieved with γ equal
to 0.002, which is larger than all reported fiber-based
QKD schemes. By comparison with single-photon QKD
schemes, we found that in SEPM-QKD and TF-QKD
the wave state can be used as a new information carrier
that has different properties due to interference-induced
detection enhancement, which allows photons to travel
in fibers with a higher transmittance over longer com-
munication distance. In the future, we wish to reduce
the impact of the phase-insensitive coincidence counting
rate on the key rate and to improve the key rate and
communication distance of SEPM-QKD.
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